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ABSTRACT
The emerging literature on migration and security is predomin-
antly focused on the threats that migration movements may have
to the security in destination countries. This article shifts the focus
to a migrant’s sending country and explores different socio-eco-
nomic factors that could be associated with the process of radic-
alisation and the development of violent extremism among youth
there. We use survey data collected from a sample of 4,500 young
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B.i.H.) by USAID MEASURE-
B.i.H. An index of radicalisation is constructed and used as a
dependent variable. It is based on Bhui et al. and measures sym-
pathies for violent protest and terrorism. It is regressed on a set
of demographic characteristics, migration experience and social
behaviour. The model was estimated by ordinary least squares
(O.L.S.) with the index as a continuous dependent variable. The
findings suggest that a range of factors including demographic
characteristics, location, employment status, income, practicing of
religion, and civic and political activism are associated with a
degree of sympathy for violent extremism among youth in B.i.H.
These results should provide useful insights into the relationship
between the drivers and extremism, which then should help insti-
tutions to design more effective preventative and counter-
ing measures.
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Following increased number of terrorist attacks round the world, a large scholarly
attention and contribution has been given to better understanding the phenomena
and drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism, particularly among youth. In gen-
eral, some authors (e.g., Gullain & Lynn, 2009; Harriet et al., 2015) distinguish
between macro- (country-level), meso- (community and identity related) and micro-
level (individual) factors as drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism. Systematic
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reviews of research on this topic show inconclusive evidence (Harriet et al., 2015)
about the main drivers influencing radicalisation and violent extremism.
In B.i.H. and the Western Balkan region the topic of preventing youth radicalisa-
tion has increasingly become a part of policy discussions over past several years. This
subject has gained prominence due to media’s attention on returning B.i.H. citizens
who had gained battlefield experience in Syria and Iraq as members of Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (I.S.I.L.), and to some extent to those returning from Ukraine
as supporters of pro-Russian rebels (Azinovic & Becirevic, 2017; Becirevic, 2018;
Perry, 2016). Therefore, in the current public discourse, threat of radicalisation is pri-
marily viewed through the prism of Islamic or I.S.I.L. radicalisation. However, in the
last 20 years, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B.i.H.) have witnessed many other
forms of radicalisation and extremism, which have been mostly neglected (Becirevic,
2018). Those are different forms of ethnic nationalism and separatism and religious
extremism, to which we add radical anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
(L.G.B.T.) movements and so-called left-wing nationalists. Such movements can be
viewed as radical only under the condition that its adherents are willing to use or are
ready to justify the use of violence and consequently sacrifice human life in order to
support their cause or viewpoint or make political protest.
Therefore, in this study, we assume that radicalisation is a construct used to
explain social and psychological processes by which ordinary citizens become so
aggrieved that they are willing to sacrifice their lives and the lives of innocent civil-
ians to make a political protest (Bhui et al., 2014). Furthermore, it is important that
we make a distinction between individuals and groups which might adhere to
extreme views or ideologies but are not supportive of violence and those who might
hold mainstream views within their communities or adhere to socially acceptable
ideologies but are supportive of violence and violent means for initiating a social
change. We assume the latter to be radicalised because of their support of violence
and willingness to sacrifice human life in order to make a political protest or instigate
political change. This distinction is important and relevant to B.i.H.’s context because
of the legacy of most recent armed conflict and still present competing and mutually
exclusive war narratives among the country’s three main ethnic groups (see, for
example, Berdak, 2015).
As pointed by Silke (2008), young people are perceived to be more at risk of radic-
alisation than any other age group, since the most people that join a terrorist groups
are young and male. Furthermore, a number of studies point to general susceptibility
of young males to taking risky behaviour and resorting to violence (Budd et al., 2005;
Farrington, 2003; Silke, 2008). In B.i.H. young people are considered to be at a par-
ticularly vulnerable social and economic position because of their extremely high rates
of unemployment and social exclusion (Commission for International Justice and
Accountability [C.I.J.A.], 2016, p. 36; Becirevic, 2018, p. 22), which could induce
grievance and desire to revenge. This makes young people more at risk of radicalisa-
tion than any other age groups in B.i.H.
Historically, extremism and radicalisation have had their roots in struggles related
to nationalism or ethnicity, political beliefs, and class struggle. The process of radical-
isation usually happens over a period of time and involves different factors and
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dynamics. People do not turn to violent extremism overnight and without a cause.
Drivers of radicalisation are usually complex, multifaceted and can pertain to
various political, social, economic, religious and other factors that might engender
conditions in which terrorist organisations could engage in recruitment and win
support (OSCE, 2012). Neumann (2017) emphasises indiscriminate repression,
violent conflict, and migration as the main drivers of current radicalisation. The
search for meaning or belonging can also be another important contributing factor.
Neumann (2017) points out that radicalisation almost always involves authority
figures, charismatic leaders, or tightly knit peer groups for generating trust, commit-
ment, loyalty and peer pressure.
Although unemployment among youth is ‘the usual suspect’ among possible driv-
ers of radicalisation and violent extremism, the research evidence produced so far is
ambivalent. The findings suggest that a majority of terrorists were either unemployed
or underemployed, e.g., 88% of Chechen militants were unemployed (Speckhard &
Ahkmedova, 2006). On the other hand, the evidence also suggests that a rather large
number of terrorists were relatively well educated (Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006)
and gave up successful careers, or combined them with terrorist activity (Sageman,
2004). However, there is at least some agreement in the literature suggesting that
militant groups recruit from the ranks of the unemployed (Hassan, 2012).
Analogous to the relationship between unemployment and radicalisation, the same
applies to evidence on relationship between poverty/deprivation and radicalisation
and violent extremism. Research (e.g., Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010) restricted solely to ter-
rorism, tends to conclude that terrorists are definitively not poor, deprived or even
relatively deprived. As Krueger and Laitin (2008) put it in a summary of the literature
to date, ‘studies at the individual level of analysis have failed to find any direct con-
nection between education, poverty, and the propensity to participate in terrorism.
… If anything, those who participate in terrorism tend to come from the ranks of
the better off in society’. Furthermore, their econometric analysis shown that econom-
ics explains the target, not the origin, of transnational terrorism. Krueger and Jitka
(2003) acknowledge that poor countries produce more terrorists, but insist that GDP
per capita is not related to the number of terrorists when controlling for other fac-
tors, such as the extent of civil liberties. Opinion poll data in Pakistan suggests that
support for militancy is higher among middle-class respondents than lower-class
respondents (Blair et al., 2013). Furthermore, in Central Asia, there is evidence that
Islamic radicals ‘have been drawn from the relatively well-off and educated urban
populations as well as from among the poorer segments of the Central Asian soci-
eties’ (Omelicheva, 2010).
Graff (2010) points out that there is no robust empirical relationship between pov-
erty and radicalisation, but it is weak states (the majority of them are also very poor)
that are more vulnerable to extremism. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also identify poverty
and state weakness as one of the most important salient conditions for the onset of
civil war. More importantly, violent extremist groups operating in war-afflicted coun-
tries are frequently representing economically deprived minorities. This suggests that
poverty may in fact be a factor inducing extremist violence – but only of certain
types, e.g., in a civil war situation, or in low-income but highly unequal countries.
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We can conclude based on the above review of literature that income poverty,
deprivation and underemployment do not provide sufficient explanations for violent
extremism. However, it is suggested that they can contribute and provide a fertile
ground, which in combination with other factors, particularly grievances, create an
environment conducive to violent extremist groups.
The aim of this study is to analyse the effect of different socio-economic factors on
possible radicalisation among youth in B.i.H., by using a novel approach to quantify
degree of sympathy towards radicalisation. The study is based on the analysis of data
from a survey of youth aged 15–30. Consequently, in the quantitative analysis we
need to model the relationships and operationalise these concepts in such a manner
to be relevant for B.i.H., including the effect of migration experience, experiences of
discrimination, grievances, as well as rising importance of religious identity.
Considering the nature of B.i.H.’s recent war and troublesome post-war recovery
process, the threats of youth radicalisation have been ever present. In official docu-
ments it can be found that perceived risk factors include wartime and post-conflict
trauma, perceived or actual social exclusion, peer influence, petty crime and juvenile
delinquency, previous experiences with law enforcement authorities, alienation from
family members, poor economic opportunities, engagement with religious individuals
or communities, and the support (or lack of) available through social services
(Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016). In addition to the aforemen-
tioned, B.i.H. still has a large number of people living in displacement within the
country as a direct result of the war during which more than 50% of the population
was forced to change its place of living. This includes an estimated 1.2 million refu-
gees who fled during the conflict outside the country (Helsinski komitet za ljudska
prava u BiH, 1998). Following the conflict, there has been considerable degrees of
movement across the border, as refugees and displaced persons choose to return to
B.i.H. and as many migrate, often to diaspora locations in Western Europe.
Nowadays maintaining links with relatives and friends living abroad has never been
easier due to the rise in Internet accessibility and the emergence of online social net-
works, as well as relatively cheap possibilities for travel. Moreover, recent literature
points out that a significant number of terrorist attacks were committed by individu-
als who spent the majority or the entirety of their lives in Western societies. This
study aims to capture the effect of migration experience of respondents.
2. Methodology
The aim of this study is to identify the main socio-economic factors that could be
associated with the process of radicalisation and the development of violent extrem-
ism among youth, including the exposure to social remittances, i.e., either through
personal migration experience or through regular contacts with B.i.H. citizens cur-
rently living abroad. In our study, we use Bhui et al.’s (2014) definitions of radicalisa-
tion and violent extremism, where radicalisation is defined as the process by which a
person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.
Violent extremism is described as endorsement of violence to achieve political
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objectives. Also, as pointed out in the literature, we need to acknowledge that there
are different forms of extremism and not all extremism is necessarily violent.
The list of indicators for measuring dependent variables is designed accordingly
and included in the questionnaire (Appendix A). Bhui et al.’s (2014) paper uses a
new measure of radicalisation based on sympathies for violent protest and terrorism,
which we find appropriate for the purpose of answering the research questions.
Moreover, we do not a priori assume that radicalisation and extremism is based on
religious beliefs or belonging to a certain religious communities, as was often
assumed in previous research. Therefore, rather than reducing radicalisation to reli-
gion-based motives, our model uses religion as one of the possible explanatory indica-
tors among a wide set of socio-economic and individual level indicators.
The indicators were grouped into a set of seven dimensions of the Index, based on
the IOM study (2016). The dimensions include both indicators of resilience and of
radicalisation, and are named as follows: (1) positive youth engagement; (2) youth–-
community relations; (3) economic opportunities; (4) social and life-skills; (5) risk
awareness and community resilience capacity; (6) sympathy for ideologies and causes
of violent extremism; and (7) presence of violent extremism in local community. The
composition of the Index was further checked statistically through a factor analysis.
The table describing the composition of the Index, as well as indicating the list of
questions from the survey that were used to measure indicators and their allocations
per dimension is provided in Appendix A. As we can see from the table in Appendix
A, Positive youth engagement dimension describes civil society and political engage-
ment, but also involvement in extracurricular activities and voluntary work.
Youth–community relations dimension measures level of trust and satisfaction with
institutions, civil society and religious institutions. The economic opportunities
dimension of the Index describes a person’s feeling of injustice, deservedness and eco-
nomic opportunities in the country. The social and life-skills dimension describes an
individual’s value complexity, tolerance and acceptance, trust in neighbours and social
network. Sympathy for V.E. ideologies and causes measures the degree to which
respondents individually express their sympathy towards use of violence as means to
achieve a political/religious goal, and in particular their views and support for foreign
fighters. Finally, the remaining two dimensions are about community-level external
factors. Risk awareness and community resilience capacity, and the presence of vio-
lent extremism in the local community, include responses to questions about a
respondent’s perception of the risk within a community due to the presence of local
influencers and recruiters, as well as the capacity of a community to resist them
through self-organisation and cooperation among civil society actors.
For the independent variables, a range of different studies were consulted and used
to make a comprehensive list of indicators that should be potentially used in analy-
sing the phenomenon and identifying the main drivers of radicalisation and violent
extremism. According to Ranstrop (2016), violent extremism can be best conceptual-
ised as a combination of micro- and meso-level factors that create an infinite number
of combinations. These factors include: (1) individual socio-psychological factors; (2)
social factors; (3) political factors; (4) ideological and religious dimensions; (5) the
role of culture and identity issues; (6) trauma and other trigger mechanisms; and
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three other factors that are a motor for radicalisation: (7) group dynamics; (8) radi-
calisers/groomers; and (9) the role of social media. It is the combined interplay of
some of these factors that causes violent extremism. In our case, some of these factors
are actually indicators the Index is composed of, so they are not included in the
model as independent variables. For example, a set of individual socio-psychological
factors that are considered to influence radicalisation include grievances and emotions
such as: alienation and exclusion; anger and frustration; grievance and a strong sense
of injustice; feelings of humiliation; rigid binary thinking; a tendency to misinterpret
situations and acquire conspiracy theories; a sense of victimhood; personal vulnerabil-
ities; and counter-cultural elements. They are included in the Index. This also applies
to variables from the groups of factors named ‘Political factors’, ‘Ideological and reli-
gious dimensions’, ‘Group dynamics’ and ‘Radicalisers/groomers’.
Individual factors (
P
indiv) include respondent’s sex, age, marital status, education
level, employment status and ethnicity. Household level factors included in the model
(
P
hh) are household’s size and household’s income. Social factors (Rsocial) include
political and civic activism. Religion (Rreligion) includes both a set of dummy varia-
bles for religious affiliation of the respondent, as well as the frequency of actively
practicing religion. We also included a set of location dummies (Rregion).
Migration factors (Rmigration) include migration experience, as well as contact
with relatives abroad, as a measure of possible connections with more or less radical-
ised communities in other countries.
2.1. Model specification
The empirical model to be estimated is specified as follows:




hhþ b3social þ b4
X
migration
þ b5religion þ b5regionþ ui (1)
Equation (1) is a reduced form representing a set of factors that are considered to
be associated with the degree of radicalisation and violent extremism among youth.
The dependent variable (Index) is created by combining approaches used in Bhui
et al. (2014) and IOM Community Based Approach to Support Youth in Targeted
Municipalities in BiH (IOM) (2016), where different items are used to create a com-
posite measure of support for violent protest, radicalisation and terrorism. The meas-
ure of sympathy for radicalisation is a commonly used proxy for violent extremism
in literature, since it would not be ethically acceptable to use questions that would
measure an individual’s degree or experience of violent extremism behaviour. The
responses to each individual question was normalised into values 0–100. A higher
score indicates less support for violent protest, radicalisation and terrorism.
Since there is no appropriate counterfactual that would allow a quasi-experimental
approach to estimation, the analysis of the model described in the previous section
was conducted by a regression analysis of the model specification presented in
Equation (1). This model is estimated by a simple ordinary least squares
(O.L.S.) method.
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2.2. Data
Data used for the empirical testing of the model are taken from the BiH Youth Survey,
conducted by USAID/BiH’s MEASURE Activity in 2017. The survey covers a representa-
tive sample of around 4,5000 young people (aged 15- to 30-years-old) in B.i.H. The sam-
pling procedure applied in this survey was a two-stage random stratified sampling, using
preliminary estimates from the 2013 BiH Census as a sampling frame. The first stage
stratification was by 18 regions in B.i.H. In the second stage, the sample was further strati-
fied by urbanisation level categories within each region, resulting in 49 sampling strata.
Selection of sampling units was implemented in two stages. Primary sampling units
(municipalities) were selected using simple random sampling from each of 18 geograph-
ical regions. Secondary sampling units (streets and village/rural settlements) were selected
in the second stage, also using simple random sampling. Then, as the survey was imple-
mented as a computer-assisted personal interviewing (C.A.P.I.) survey, interviewers were
instructed to go to randomly selected addresses (using ‘Random Walk Technique’, after
being given a starting point in each of the sampling units) and conduct interviews with a
representative sample of civilian, non-institutionalised young adults aged 15- to 30-years-
old (randomly selected using ‘Last Birthday Procedure’).
The descriptive analysis of the data used is presented in the remainder of this sec-
tion. First, we present descriptive statistics of continuous variables (Table 1).
Source: Own calculations from USAID/BiH Youth Survey 2017.
We present the number and share of respondents for the indicative variables.
Since the model includes sets of indicative variables for age and region, we also pre-
sent the share of respondents in each category of these two variables. For the sake of
clarity of presentation of the table, these two variables are presented separately in
Table 2. Figure 1 presents the sample structure by age of respondent. Table 3 presents
the geographical distribution of the sample.
Source: Own calculations from USAID/BiH Youth Survey 2017.
As we can see, the sample is balanced with regards to sex, age, marital status, educa-
tion level, and location. Only with regards to ethnicity and religion, we see that Croats/
Catholic religion is under-represented in the sample. It is also worth noting that there is
a rather small share of respondents being engaged in civic activism, which is in line with
previous studies showing rather low civic activism among the population of B.i.H.
Finally, we can see that the vast majority of youth have regular access to the Internet.
3. Results
3.1. Results from regression analysis
The following section describes results of the regression analysis of the model
described in the Equation (1). The results are presented in Table 1. The results
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of continuous variables.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Index 4,500 55.176 13.867 0 100
Number of household members 4,500 2.376 1.327 0 10
Source: Own calculations from USAID/BiH Youth Survey 2017.
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presented include values of estimated coefficients and statistical significance of the
coefficients. Since the dependent variable is the Index that measures sympathy
towards violence and radicalisation in the way that a higher value indicates less sym-
pathy, the coefficients should be interpreted in a manner that positively indicate a
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of indicative variables.
Category Frequency Percentage
Respondent’s sex – Male 2,217 49.27
Respondent’s sex – Female 2,283 50.73
Have relatives abroad 590 16.86






Domestic partnership 18 0.4
Education level
No education 29 0.65
Elementary school 930 20.87
Secondary school, three-year program 917 20.58
Secondary school, four-year program 1,984 44.52
Junior college (two-year university programme) 63 1.41
University education, bachelor 463 10.39
University education, Masters or PhD 70 1.57
Employment status
Unemployed, with occasional jobs, activities 32 0.71
Unemployed, actively looking for work 78 1.73
Unemployed/pupil/student, not looking for a job 4,273 94.96
Unpaid everyday house/farm work, looking 90 2





Engaged in civic activism 213 6.09
Not engaged in civic activism 3,287 93.91
Access to Internet
Yes 3,242 92.63
No, but I have occasional access to the Internet 175 5
No and I mainly (or completely) do not 83 2.37
Lives in an urban area 1,921 42.69















Yes, regularly all the rules 252 5.98
Mainly yes 1,169 27.73
Only the main rules 1,909 45.29
No – I am a believer but don’t practice 762 18.08
No answer 123 2.92
Source: Own calculations from USAID/BiH Youth Survey 2017.
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coefficient suggested association of the respective variable with a decrease in radical-
isation and increase of resilience. Estimated coefficients from both the full and
reduced models are presented in Table 4. The full model estimated coefficients for all
the variables specified is presented in Equation (1). In the reduced model, a set of
variables that were found to be statistically insignificant were excluded in order to
estimate a parsimonious model.
According to the results from both models presented in Table 4, we can see that
the same set of variables appears to be statistically (in)significant in both models. The
results suggest that sex, ethnicity, living in a rural area, religion and migration (if liv-
ing abroad or if having relatives abroad) are not associated with more or less sym-
pathy towards radicalisation and violence. For those reasons, these variables were
excluded from the estimation in order to estimate a parsimonious model.
Figure 1. Number of respondents by age. Source: Own calculations from USAID/BiH Youth Survey 2017.
Table 3. Number of respondent by region.
Category Frequency Percentage
Region
Una-Sana Canton 385 8.56
Posavina Canton 55 1.22
Tuzla Canton 585 13
Zenica-Doboj Canton 380 8.44
Bosnian podrinje Canton 30 0.67
Central Bosnia Canton (Bosniak majority) 245 5.44
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (Bosniak majority) 150 3.33
West Herzegovina Canton 120 2.67
Sarajevo Canton 535 11.89
Canton 10 110 2.44
Region Banja Luka northwest 680 15.11
Doboj North 245 5.44
Region Bijeljina 245 5.44
Pale east 225 5
Trebinje southeast 85 1.89
Central Bosnia Canton (Croat majority) 145 3.22
Herzegovina-Neretva canton (Croat majority) 170 3.78
Brcko District 110 2.44
Source: Own calculations from USAID/BiH Youth Survey 2017.
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Table 4. Results of the model estimation.
Index Full model Reduced model
Sex, 1 if female, 0 if male 0.343 0.371
Age dummies, 19 as a benchmark
Age ¼1 if 20-years-old 0.030 0.031
Age ¼1 if 21-years-old 0.873 0.743
Age ¼1 if 22-years-old 1.213 1.204
Age ¼1 if 23-years-old 1.461 1.452
Age ¼1 if 24-years-old 1.168 1.191
Age ¼1 if 25-years-old 0.597 0.391
Age ¼1 if 26-years-old 1.671 1.508
Age ¼1 if 27-years-old 0.357 0.457
Age ¼1 if 28-years-old 0.947 0.836
Age ¼1 if 29-years-old 1.309 1.123
Age ¼1 if 30-years-old 1.032 1.102
Age ¼1 if 31-years-old 1.800 2.170
Age ¼1 if 32-years-old 0.838 1.108
Age ¼1 if 33-years-old 1.208 1.217
Age ¼1 if 34-years-old 0.623 0.749
Household size 0.262 0.352
Household’s income 0.247 0.284
Marital status, single as benchmark
¼1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.633 0.688
¼1 if widow/widower, 0 otherwise 0.866 0.332
¼1 if divorced/separated, 0 otherwise 0.317 0.085
¼1 if domestic relationship, 0 otherwise 0.623 0.254
Ethnicity, Bosniak as a benchmark
¼1 if Serb 2.169 –
¼1 if Croat 4.739 –
¼1 if Roma 2.761 –
¼1 if Bosnian and Herzegovinian 1.826 –
¼1 if Other 3.975 –
¼1 if Does not want to answer 1.474 –
Religion, Muslim as a benchmark
¼1 if Orthodox 5.214 –
¼1 if Catholic 1.462 –
Actively practicing religion, ‘Yes, regularly all the rules’ as a benchmark
Mainly yes 0.661 –
Only the main rules 1.351 –
No – I am a believer but don’t practice 2.695 –
No answer 2.424 –
Education dummies, no education is benchmark
¼1 if primary education 2.417 2.850
¼1 if secondary education 3 years 2.911 3.227
¼1 if secondary education 4 years 2.609 2.840
¼1 if university education 2 years 3.368 3.633
¼1 if university education 4 years 2.875 3.144
¼1 if postgraduate education 4.915 4.591
Employment status, employed as a benchmark
¼1 if unemployed 4.716 5.017
¼1 if 1 if student 2.825 3.507
¼1 if unpaid family member 3.940 4.697
Voting in elections, benchmark if regularly voting
¼1 if voting sometimes 1.501 1.257
¼1 if voting rarely 1.609 1.651
¼1 if voting never 2.155 2.418
¼1 if not engaged in any actions of civic activism, 0 if yes 3.570 3.281
¼1 if having occasional access to Internet, 0 if regular access 2.277 2.380
¼1 if not having access to Internet, 0 if regular access 3.257 3.847
¼1 if never lived abroad, 0 if yes 0.267 –
¼1 if not having relatives abroad, 0 if yes 0.206 –
¼1 if living in rural area, 0 if living in urban area 0.219 0.261
(continued)
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Most of the estimated coefficients are hypothesised. Household size is associated
with less radicalisation. Also, being married is associated with less radicalisation. The
same applies for education level, where more education is associated with less radical-
isation, but only after secondary level. Social factors, such as participation in civic
actions or in elections were also included in the extended model. Results suggest that
those who are more active (in civic actions or voting in elections, for example) are
less likely to be radicalised. Having more regular access to the Internet is also associ-
ated with less radicalisation and extremism.
From the results of both the full and the reduced model we can see that, although
radicalisation is relatively equally distributed among different ethnic or religious
groups, more active practicing of religion is associated with lower degree of radical-
isation. This is important and perhaps to some extent a surprising finding. Another
surprising finding is that employment status has a negative indication in that the
unemployed, unpaid family workers and students are less radicalised than employed
individuals. However, this finding corresponds to previous research that suggested
that many extremists or terrorists were not unemployed, but underemployed, which
may have caused some grievances and sense of injustice. Finally, our results suggest
that a household’s income is in negative association with the Index, suggesting that
individuals from more well-off households are more likely to be sympathetic towards
radicalisation and violent extremism.
The age of respondents was included in the model as a set of indicative variables in
order to relax the assumption of a linear effect of age on radicalisation. Also, regional
dummies were included as control variables. As the results suggest, only the ages
22–24, 26, 29, 31 and 33 are associated with more radicalisation. Furthermore, all
regions compared to the benchmark Una-Sana Canton appear to be more radicalised,
particularly in Bosnian Podrinje Canton, Pale region, Central Bosnia and Brdsko
Table 4. Continued.
Index Full model Reduced model
Region, Una-Sana Canton as benchmark
Posavina Canton 4.052 3.111
Tuzla Canton 5.338 4.880
Zenica-Doboj Canton 7.800 7.017
Bosnian podrinje Canton 10.373 9.794
Central Bosnia Canton (Bosniak majority) 8.031 7.276
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (Bosniak majority) 4.963 4.259
West Herzegovina Canton 6.210 4.759
Sarajevo Canton 7.199 6.552
Canton 10 6.798 5.505
Region Banja Luka northwest 5.401 5.826
Doboj North 2.831 2.559
Region Bijeljina 4.057 3.645
Pale east 8.576 8.562
Trebinje southeast 5.152 4.843
Central Bosnia Canton (Croat majority) 7.131 6.332
Herzegovina-Neretva canton (Croat majority) 7.160 5.666
Brcko District 7.912 6.888
Intercept 59.077 55.378
Number of obs 2583 2759
R-squared 0.266 0.249
Prob> F 0.000 0.000
p< 0.01, p< 0.05, p< 0.1.
Source: Own calculations from USAID/BiH Youth Survey 2017.
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District. However, due to a limited number of observations in many of the above cate-
gories for both age and region, these findings should be taken with a caution.
4. Conclusions and recommendations
A number of radicalisation push-factors – including demographic, social, political
and economic reasons that fuel grievances, a sense of injustice and discrimination,
social exclusion and marginalisation, as well as disappointment with democratic proc-
esses – are present in B.i.H. However, as the findings from the regression analysis
suggest, the radicalisation among youth is the result of a complex interplay of various
factors and should not necessarily be simplified to any of them. Some of the import-
ant factors that are correlated with a higher degree of radicalisation among youth are
higher household’s income, lower education attainment, marital status, employment
status, and not voting nor taking part in civic activities. On the other hand, gender,
living in urban areas or having relatives abroad is not associated with more or less
radicalisation. Our findings also suggest that sympathies for radicalisation are equally
present among all ethnic and religious groups in B.i.H.
Furthermore, our findings suggest that identification of the main drivers of radical-
isation among youth is not straightforward. Radicalisation should be explained rather
as a process where different factors intertwine, influencing the overall level of depriv-
ation of an individual, which then affects her/his social life, and her/his perception
about the community. This in turn significantly affects a degree of each person’s
resilience or sympathy towards radicalisation. Moreover, our findings suggest that by
focusing on only one of the problems among youth, i.e., unemployment or employ-
ment skills or similar, without addressing other factors that affect their social life and
general well-being, will not result in desired outcomes. Therefore, in order to decrease
the vulnerability of youth towards inclusion in radical groups and participation in
violent activities in B.i.H., we need broader measures that should be targeted across
all religious and ethnic communities and all socio-economic groups. Considering the
country’s recent war and presence of the war narratives, the future research should
be focused on linkages between radicalisation and perceptions about the outcome of
the war and understanding of what would be a just peace.
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Includes civil society engagement (measuring
changes in attitude, aspiration/intention
regarding participation in civil society and
actual behavioural change of such
engagements),
84, 86
Political engagement. Measured political self-
efficacy and behavioural changes of external
political efficacy
Extracurricular activities and voluntary work.
Measured changes in attitude, aspiration/
intention regarding participation in
extracurricular activities, such as sports,
cultural, social clubs and organisations, or





Trust and satisfaction – institutions. Measured
attitudinal changes regarding trust for local
government, intention to vote, etc. and
behavioural changes of interactions with local
government/public authorities.
18, 19
Trust and satisfaction – civil society. Measured
attitudinal changes regarding civil society,
including representativeness, thematic focus,
target group, etc.
Trust and satisfaction – religious institutions.
Measured attitudinal changes regarding local
religious community, including
representativeness, reflection of personal
view, and trust for religious leaders.
Economic opportunities
(Attitudinal; behavioural)
Feeling of injustice. Measured attitudinal
changes in anger, frustration and perceptions
of injustice relative to other groups (age,
ethnic, political groups)
65, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 100
Deservedness. Measured attitudinal changes in
feeling of deservedness relative to their
education or other formal qualifications.
Economic opportunities. Measured attitudinal
changes regarding pessimism/optimism in
future professional career, and behavioural
changes, such as concrete investment to
enhance career opportunities.
(continued)





Value complexity. Measured attitudinal changes
regarding in perceptions of other values,
views and opinions
81, 82, 83, 94, 95
Tolerance and acceptance. Measured attitudinal
and behavioural changes linked to tolerance
and acceptance of ‘others’ and other groups,
including negative stereotypes.
Trust in neighbours. Measured attitudinal and
behavioural changes towards other members
of community.
Social network. Measured personal relations with
friends and family – ‘someone to turn to in
need of support’.
Risk awareness and community
resilience capacity
(Knowledge, awareness; Skills)
Awareness of risks and assistance. Measured VE
risk awareness and knowledge, including local
influencers and groups, rhetoric, persuasion
and recruitment practices.
103
Capacity to self-organise. Measured perceptions
of communities’ capacity (including civil
society, religious community, etc.) to self-
organise to deal with external threats.
Cooperation. Measured perceptions of
community actors capacity and willingness to
cooperate to deal with external threats.
Sympathy for VE ideologies and
causes (attitudinal)
Sympathy for violent protests. Measured
attitudinal changes and expressed sympathy
for use of violence as means to achieve a
political/religious goal
89
Sympathy for extremist ideologies. Measured
attitudinal changes and expressed sympathy
for ‘views considered extreme by the
majority’, and whether such groups should be
allowed to hold public meetings, publish
books, etc. to spread their ideology.
Support for foreign fighters. Measured attitudinal
changes in support for foreign fighters.
Presence of violent extremism in
local community
(knowledge, awareness)
Violent extremist influences and groups.
Measured knowledge of active recruiters,
extremist groups and ideologies in, or in
close proximity to, the community, and
perceptions of that presence as a problem/
threat to community.
104
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